Tulsa Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 2

Article 28

Winter 2018

Faith, Reason, and Liberal Legal Neutrality
Jason E. Whitehead
Jason.Whitehead@csulb.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jason E. Whitehead, Faith, Reason, and Liberal Legal Neutrality, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 375 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss2/28

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Whitehead: Faith, Reason, and Liberal Legal Neutrality
WHITEHEAD, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (375) (CORRECTED2) (DO NOT DELETE)

3/8/2018 10:01 AM

FAITH, REASON, AND LIBERAL LEGAL
NEUTRALITY
Jason E. Whitehead*
FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, TAKING RITES SERIOUSLY: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
REASONABLENESS OF FAITH (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP.
225. HARDCOVER $99.99.
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (JEAN L. COHEN &
CÉCILE LABORDE EDS.) (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP. 456.
HARDCOVER $120.00.

INTRODUCTION: THE CONTINUING “WARS OF RELIGION”
Nearly 370 years after the Peace of Westphalia, the conflict between religious faith
and modern political sovereignty continues to rage. Whether the issue is the right of
religious citizens to exempt themselves from generally applicable public laws or the
legitimacy of public laws motivated by religious values, Western liberal democracies
continue to have trouble deciding what to do about religious practices and beliefs. The
United States legal system has struggled in recent years, of course, with religiously
motivated laws against same-sex marriage.1 More recently, American courts have been
dealing with the ability of Christian business owners to refuse to engage in legallymandated activities they consider sinful, such as providing contraception to their
employees2 or providing wedding-related services to gay couples.3 Europe has seen
similar controversies, such as France, Switzerland, and other nations restricting Muslim
women wearing the Hijab, the Burka, the so-called “Burkini,” and other religiously
motivated modest clothing in public places,4 and Italy’s allowance of crucifixes in public
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Legal Studies Program, California State
University, Long Beach. I would like to acknowledge and thank my student, June Yoo, for helping me with some
of the initial research for this essay. I am also grateful to my friend Dr. Paul Chen for all our fruitful conversations
about Christianity and postmodernism.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015);
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
2. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
3. See, e.g., Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017); Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc. 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015); Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
4. See, e.g., Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Alissa J. Rubin, French “Burkini” Bans
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schools coupled with the suppression of Muslim religious symbols and practices, 5 to name
just a few.
Francis Beckwith6 and the authors published in the Cohen-Laborde volume7 ably
document and analyze at least part of the problem giving rise to these sorts of
controversies, which is our lack of agreement about the nature of religious faith compared
to other beliefs and practices. Specifically, is a belief or practice that is motivated by
religious faith somehow “special,” in the sense that it deserves to be treated with extra
respect or even treated with extra caution by the legal system, or should religious beliefs
and practices be treated the same as any others?8 These authors also ably demarcate the
stakes of this debate. Whatever choice the legal system makes – to favor, disfavor, or even
ignore the religious quality of beliefs and practices – it seems to risk violating key liberal
democratic norms such as popular sovereignty, neutrality, equality, and pluralism.9
It would be impossible for one essay to fully describe and respond to each argument
in these books on its merits. Rather than attempt to dissect each carefully argued
conclusion or challenge each closely guarded premise, this essay focuses more narrowly
on a few key issues where additional clarity might shed light on the whole debate. First,
the essay briefly summarizes the structure and themes of the two books. Second, the essay
addresses a foundational issue at the heart of each volume: whether there are any truly
neutral standards for distinguishing and adjudicating between secular and religious claims.
I will document the different standards of neutrality discussed in both books and argue that
these standards are either illogical or unworkable, mainly due to their problematic modern
foundationalist view of rationality. Third, the essay points the way toward a more
contextual and situated view of rationality, which accounts for the socially constructed
character of knowledge claims while still allowing for the pursuit of truths outside of a
liberal framework. The essay concludes that this alternative approach to rationality can
treat religious claims and practices with the legitimacy they deserve and improve the
quality of liberal legal decisionmaking overall.
OVERVIEW OF STRUCTURE AND THEMES
Both volumes discuss the proper role of religious beliefs and practices in liberal legal
and political systems using a variety of philosophical, theological, and other types of
abstract analysis, along with a wealth of concrete legal, historical, and sociological
examples. The Cohen-Laborde volume,10 Religion, Secularism, and Constitutional
Provoke Backlash as Armed Police Confront Beachgoers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/france-burkini.html.
5. See Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 50 Eur. H.R. (G.C. 2011).
6. FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, TAKING RITES SERIOUSLY: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE REASONABLENESS OF FAITH
(2015).
7. RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Jean L. Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds.,
2015).
8. See, e.g., Cécile Laborde, Is Religion Special?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 423–33; BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 18–22.
9. See, e.g., BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 179–87; Jean L. Cohen, Introduction, in RELIGION, SECULARISM,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 2–3; Cécile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality, Religion, and the
Good, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 265–67.
10. Jean L. Cohen is the Nell and Herbert M. Singer Professor of Political Thought and Contemporary
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Democracy, combines deep philosophical and theoretical insight into the proper
relationship between religion and secular liberalism with concrete analysis of legal and
political conflicts at the national, sub-national, and international level. Part One, “Freedom
of Religion or Human Rights,” engages the history and theory of the relationship between
religious claims and liberal secularism, with applications to the female genital mutilation
and circumcision controversy and the treatment of Islam and Christianity in the European
Court of Human Rights.11 Part Two, “Nonestablishments and Freedom of Religion,”
examines and interrogates the tightrope that U.S., European, Indian, and other legal
systems walk between state-religious separation on the one hand and respect for the rights
of believers to practice their faith on the other. 12 The essays in Part Three, “Religion,
Liberalism, and Democracy,” defend and challenge various views concerning acceptable
substantive arguments and justifications in a liberal democratic framework, including
whether religious arguments pass muster.13 Finally, Part Four, “Sovereignty and Legal
Pluralism in Democratic Societies,” examines the relationship between modern politicallegal authority and religious-legal authority, demarcating and illustrating the proper
boundaries in family law, contract law, property law, and others. 14
Cohen and Laborde themselves, and virtually every one of the other authors in their
volume, are convinced that religious arguments and practices pose at least a potential threat
to the liberal democratic order, especially when the religion in question disadvantages
women, children, and other vulnerable groups. 15 Despite this concern, most of these
authors are not particularly religion-phobic. Indeed, with a couple of exceptions, there is
unexpectedly broad agreement between Beckwith and the Cohen-Laborde contributors
that religion does not necessarily pose a danger to a liberalism. 16
Civilization at Columbia University. She holds a Ph.D. from the New School for Social Research and she teaches
a variety of political and legal theory courses in Columbia’s Department of Political Science. Jean Louise Cohen,
COLUM. POL. SCI., https://polisci.columbia.edu/content/jean-louise-cohen. Cécile Laborde is Professor of
Political Theory and the Nuttfield Chair of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International
Relations at Oxford University. She holds a D.Phil. in Politics from Oxford and is a Fellow of the British
Academy. Cécile Laborde, UNIV. OXFORD: DEP’T POL. & INT’L REL., https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academicstaff/cecile-laborde.html. For a summary of the backgrounds of each contributor to the volume, see RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 435–37.
11. RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 27–109.
12. Id. at 113–225.
13. Id. at 249–337.
14. Id. at 341–422.
15. See, e.g., Anne Phillips, Religion: Ally, Threat, or Just Religion?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 51, 61 (concluding that liberal democracies should “recognize
and respect each other’s agency and freedom of conscience” with regard to religion or other modes of “selftranscendence,” unless they “actively harm others” such as by “threatening the scope for gender equality”).
16. See, e.g., Samuel Moyn, Religious Freedom and the Fate of Secularism, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 34–39; Phillips, supra note 15, at 55, 61–62; Rajeev Bhargava,
Is European Secularism Secular Enough?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY,
supra note 7, at 158–59; Tariq Modood, State-Religion Connections and Multicultural Citizenship, in RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 189–90; Cécile Laborde, Liberal Neutrality,
Religion, and the Good, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 263;
Cécile Laborde, Conclusion: Is Religion Special?, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 428–29 [hereinafter Laborde Conclusion]. But see Aurélia Bardon, Religious
Arguments and Public Justification, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note
7, at 273–92 (contending that religious arguments are always a threat to liberalism because they are based on an
absolutist logic).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2017

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 28
WHITEHEAD, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (375) (CORRECTED2) (DO NOT DELETE)

3/8/2018 10:01 AM

378

[Vol. 53:375]

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Still, Beckwith’s overall aim is more aggressive: he wants to show that legal and
political claims motivated by Christian faith are not only rational and welcome but that
they are also a necessary support for the liberal legal project.17 Mostly limited to Christian
legal claims in the U.S., Taking Rites Seriously shows Beckwith deftly combining his
legal, philosophical, and apologetics training18 to engage in abstract legal-theoretical
argument and examine concrete legal conflicts. Part One, “Reason and Motive,” defends
the rationality of religious beliefs and arguments and critiques a number of ways scholars
and judges discount these beliefs, especially in First Amendment controversies. 19 Part
Two, “Dignity and Personhood,” defends the Judeo-Christian conception of human dignity
against its materialist critics and then addresses legal debates over issues like embryonic
stem cell research and abortion.20 Finally, Part Three, “Nature and Sex,” defends a
Christian teleological view of human nature against both scientific materialism and secular
liberalism, drawing out the implications for education, same-sex marriage, adoption, and
public accommodations.21
Overall, most of the authors in both books are united in their attempt to (1) describe
and critique various versions of liberal legal neutrality toward religious and other value
claims, (2) describe and defend other versions of liberal neutrality, and (3) distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate religious practices and claims under their preferred
standards of neutrality.
INTERROGATING THE CLAIMS OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
Francis Beckwith and the contributors to the Cohen-Laborde volume assume or
explicitly argue that liberalism requires some sort of standard for distinguishing between
acceptable and unacceptable values, including religious values, especially when these
values are behind the passage of certain laws or claims for legal exemptions. In what
follows, I will sort out and assess the various standards of liberal neutrality they discuss. I
will then agree with Beckwith and some of the Cohen-Laborde contributors that any such
neutrality standard is problematic for a number of logical and epistemological reasons,
including, especially, its modern foundationalist view of rationality.
A.

Degrees of Liberal Neutrality

The main versions of liberal neutrality discussed by these authors can be organized
along a continuum from most to least permissive toward religious claims. Standards that
accept more religious influence on law would be at the more permissive end of the
17. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 3–4 (arguing that “religious beliefs and religious believers” are
“mischaracterized and seemingly misunderstood” by “those who are critical of the influence of religion and
religious citizens in politics or the formation of law”).
18. In addition to a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Fordham University, Dr. Beckwith holds a Masters of Juridical
Studies degree from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. He is currently a Professor of Philosophy
and Church-State Studies, and Co-Director of the Program in Philosophical Studies of Religion in the Institute
for Studies of Religion, at Baylor University. Francis J. Beckwith: Bio, BAYLOR UNIV.,
http://sites.baylor.edu/francisbeckwith/23-2. See also FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, RETURN TO ROME: CONFESSIONS
OF AN EVANGELICAL CATHOLIC (2008).
19. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 13–77.
20. Id. at 81–136.
21. Id. at 139–209.
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continuum, while standards that accept less religious influence would be at the more
restrictive end.
Toward the permissive end, we might place some of the “Indian Secularisms”
described by Rajeev Bhargava.22 True, the state stays aloof from “all religious and
philosophical conceptions in order to perform its primary function[s],” but one of those
primary functions is precisely to “promote a certain quality of sociability . . . among
religious communities.”23 Not that the state takes a completely benign, laissez faire
attitude toward all religious values: it still seeks to “protect individuals from the oppressive
features of their own religions.”24 Still, the point of the Indian model seems to be allowing
the maximum religious influence possible.
The model of secularism touted in the U.S. could be seen as even more permissive
than the Indian model, given its lower tolerance for state interference with religions that
engage in practices that would ordinarily be civil rights violations.25 But the U.S. model
could also be seen as less permissive given its ideal of “strict separation,” which would
prevent government promotion of sociability among religions. 26
However, truly assessing and comparing standards of liberal neutrality requires more
than a nation-by-nation comparison of ideals; it requires an intensive examination of the
logic behind these ideals. Indian secularism illustrates a permissive logic of neutrality used
by many European states as well.27 The logic is to delegitimize only those religious claims
that threaten the integrity of liberalism itself. 28 The line is drawn here to protect the
prerogatives of modern political sovereignty, which was established precisely to create
peace from religious warfare through secular monopolies on force and law. 29 This
approach obviously justifies religious disestablishment and nonestablishment, but it also
justifies limits on some overt religious practices such as wearing religious headscarves or
forming religious political parties.30
Moving toward the middle of the spectrum between permissiveness and
22. Bhargava, supra note 16, at 169–74.
23. Id. at 170–71.
24. Id. at 171.
25. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (holding
unanimously that federal anti-discrimination laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, do not apply to
a church’s hiring or termination of its own leaders).
26. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding, in part, that laws may not have a primary
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion).
27. Dieter Grimm, Sovereignty and Religious Norms in the Secular-Constitutional State, in RELIGION,
SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 341, 351; Jean L. Cohen, Rethinking Political
Secularism and the American Model of Constitutional Dualism, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 119–20; Laborde Conclusion, supra note 16, at 424.
28. Cohen, supra note 27, at 119–20; Grimm, supra note 27, at 341, 351; Laborde Conclusion, supra note
16, at 424.
29. Cohen, supra note 27, at 119–21; Grimm, supra note 27, at 341, 349–51; Laborde Conclusion, supra note
16, at 423–24.
30. Christian Joppke, Pluralism vs. Pluralism: Islam and Christianity in the European Court of Human
Rights, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 90–95. Joppke
discusses Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R., Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R., and Sahin
v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. These cases are based on Article Nine of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which protects religious liberty but allows “limitations” on religious practices “that are necessary in a
democratic society.” Id. at 91 (quoting European Convention on Human Rights art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221).
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restrictiveness, what Beckwith calls “justificatory liberalism” is one of the most common
ways of defining liberal neutrality.31 This doctrine, derived from John Rawls, requires the
state to only pass laws based on a “public justification” that even non-religious citizens
would or should find persuasive.32 Religious believers may advance laws they prefer but
only by “translating” their religious motivations into public justifications. 33 Beckwith
stops short of defending or adopting this standard wholesale, but he argues forcefully that
Christian values, such as Christian views of personhood, gender, and marriage, meet the
Rawlsian standard because they are based on public reasons. 34
Several of the Cohen-Laborde chapters also discuss this classic Rawlsian standard,
with varying degrees of approval,35 but most update it with the help of other liberal
theorists who demonstrate decreasing degrees of permissiveness. 36 Accetti, for example,
marries Rawlsian neutrality with Jürgen Habermas’s similar project.37 Habermas goes
beyond the simple translation of religious values into public reasons, and he imposes an
additional duty of “cooperative acts of translation,” whereby religious citizens deliberate
with non-religious citizens.38 This deliberation is necessary for religious values to not only
“count as legitimate . . . [public] reasons” as Rawls required, but also for religious values
to appear as “generally accessible reasons” for the deliberative partners themselves.39
Moving even further toward the restrictive end of the spectrum, Laborde considers
a newer version of liberal neutrality that purports to reject any reliance on substantive
values – Ronald Dworkin’s “egalitarian theory of religious freedom” (“ETRF”).40
According to ETRF, “religious and nonreligious conceptions of the good” are “on the same
plane” and are “entitled to equal concern and respect.”41 However, ETRF requires that the
state “not draw on, promote, or enforce religious conceptions of the good [or] . . . any
conception of the good.”42 In other words, “[t]he liberal state should be neutral toward the

31. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 178.
32. Id. at 178–87. See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993).
33. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 178–87. See also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 218 (“As
reasonable and rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of reasonable religious and philosophical
doctrines, [citizens] should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could
reasonably accept and that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.”).
34. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 187–99.
35. Laborde, supra note 16, at 249; Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Religious Truth and Democratic Freedom, in
RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 299–300; Laborde Conclusion,
supra note 16, at 428–29; Bardon, supra note 16, at 281; Modood, supra note 16, at 191.
36. Bardon, supra note 16, at 281; Laborde, supra note 16, at 249; Accetti, supra note 35, at 299–300;
Laborde Conclusion, supra note 16, at 428–29.
37. Accetti, supra note 35, at 299. See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING:
FAITH AND REASON IN A POST-SECULAR AGE (2010); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND
RELIGION (2008). Thanks to Kathryn Heard for her intelligent explanation and analysis of Habermas’s argument
and its relationship to the Rawlsian liberal tradition. See Kathryn Heard, Current Research,
http://www.kathrynheard.com/research.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2017).
38. HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION, supra note 37, at 132.
39. Id.
40. Laborde, supra note 16, at 249–50, 261. See also RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?
PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW PUBLIC DEBATE (2008); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2002).
41. Laborde, supra note 16, at 249.
42. Id.
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good simpliciter . . . .”43 The “liberal state” should not “evaluate – negatively or positively
– the content of individual conceptions of the good,” but “leave[] it to individuals to
provide, and live by, their own evaluations,” 44 and leave it to the state to evaluate only
secular reasons for practices and laws. 45
Similarly, toward the restrictive end of the spectrum, Beckwith cites numerous legal
scholars and judges who think liberalism should only allow laws and protected practices
motivated by a “secular rationalist” reason. 46 According to this standard, the liberal state
must reject all religious practices and claims because they are based on (1) unprovable
claims (in the sense that they are the sorts of belief that cannot in-principle be proven), (2)
incontestable claims (in the sense that they are the sorts of beliefs that cannot in-principle
be falsifiable), and (3) claims that cannot change or develop because they are insulated
from the ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification. 47
Aurélia Bardon defends a version of this third “secular rationalist” demand, arguing
that liberalism cannot accept any claim motivated by “indisputable” or “absolutist” first
principles.48 Similarly, Anne Phillips warns against any self-transcendence arguments that
are “beyond the realm of negotiation.” 49
B.

Assessing Liberal Non-Neutrality

There are good reasons to question the liberal aspiration toward neutrality across the
spectrum, from permissive to restrictive. First, these neutrality standards are selfcontradictory. In order to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate normative
arguments, there must exist a normative standard of legitimacy that transcends the
arguments under consideration. For instance, even if we accept the requirement that
harmful religious arguments should be excluded,50 how do we define “harm” without
contrasting it to a substantive standard of human flourishing? It would simply “be a
category mistake to imagine that there could be a Neutral justification for the practice of
Neutral justification.”51 Indeed, even the most permissive version of liberal secularism is
itself a “conception of the human good” defined in relationship to religious change and
conflict.52
The non-neutrality of liberalism makes sense in light of the historical roots of
European liberalism in elite and popular changes to Christian faith practices. 53
Contemporary postwar liberalism was even more directly affected by theological and
counter-theological trends, says Samuel Moyn, through the influence of Eastern Orthodox
43. Id.
44. Id. at 253 (citing DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, supra note 40).
45. Id.
46. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 22.
47. Id.
48. Bardon, supra note 16, at 282–83.
49. Phillips, supra note 15, at 51.
50. See id. at 51, 61.
51. Bardon, supra note 16, at 280 (quoting Bruce Ackerman, What Is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS
372, 387–90 (1983)).
52. Laborde, supra note 16, at 261.
53. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 353–76 (2007) (documenting how modern secularism arose due to
transformations in Christian belief).
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philosopher Charles Malik and Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, as well as other
“Christians critical of secularism,”54 and then later by the collapse of Christian society and
the immigration-fueled growth of Islam in Europe.55
This phenomenon of waning Christianity and waxing Islam has given rise to the
effort, discussed above, to distinguish between those religious claims that are seen as a
threat to the sovereignty of the Western European liberal order (like the headscarf in
France and other places) and those that are not (like the crucifix in Italian classrooms).
But, whatever their other merits, these efforts are obviously not neutral: they clearly prefer
liberal secularist ideals over the competing claims of religion. And they also produce an
ethnic and cultural favoritism, disadvantaging practices and claims that are more alien to
liberalism while advantaging those that are more familiar.
Some, like Tariq Modood, minimize the Christian and post-Christian roots of liberal
neutrality on the grounds that religion and religious values simply form the “historicalcultural character” of the society, giving rise to a number of religious and non-religious
“comprehensive doctrines.”56 Modood, in true Rawslian-Habermasian-Dworkinian
fashion, argues that religious doctrines are legitimate bases of law and public policy so
long as they overlap with other non-religious comprehensive doctrines.57 Beckwith
appears to accept this overlapping requirement, preferring to base his argument on the
contention that Christian claims – especially those involving same-sex marriage – should
be acceptable under this standard.58
But arguments at the moderate to restrictive end of the spectrum, requiring that
religious claims shed their theological roots and evolve into non-religious “reasonable
comprehensive doctrines,” still display a marked distaste for explicit religious claims and
a preference instead for non-religious standards like “self-transcendence,”59 or even antireligious standards like “ethical self-determination.”60 Even if we accept the new
standards, there needs to be an “uncontroversial, neutral way of drawing the line between
matters of personal ethics . . . and the pursuit of . . . more impersonal public goods” that
are the subject of normatively inspired comprehensive doctrines. 61 Arguments like
Rawls’s, Habermas’s, and Dworkin’s “are not neutral in this sense: they are substantive
arguments that take a distinctive stance” against what are clearly “religious matters.” 62
These versions of liberal neutrality simply cannot “avoid falling back either on a . . . form
of relativism” that they are trying to disavow “or on a kind of dogmatism that mirrors the
religious one these theories are supposed to replace.”63
Given these problems with liberal neutrality across the spectrum, liberal theory
54. Moyn, supra note 16, at 30–34, 36.
55. Id. at 39.
56. Modood, supra note 16, at 190–91.
57. Id.
58. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 174–75.
59. Phillips, supra note 15, at 51.
60. Laborde, supra note 16, at 262–63.
61. Id. at 263.
62. Id.
63. Bardon, supra note 16, at 280–81 (citing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 13 (1993)
(criticizing the idea of neutrality on the ground that it is used to conceal moral liberal claims and “the society’s
broader prejudice against religious devotion”)).
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needs to either find a trustworthy source of values outside liberalism that justifies liberal
legal and political practices like human dignity, equality, and justice, or drop the neutrality
goal entirely and explicitly reject religious practices and claims. I will pursue the first
choice in the next section, but I will conclude this section by discussing the problems
inherent in the second choice.
C.

The Root of the Issue: The Limits of Modern Rationalism

Only one of the essays in the Cohen-Laborde volume embraces the challenge of
explicitly rejecting religious arguments: Aurélia Bardon’s essay, Religious Arguments and
Public Justification.64 The clash between this essay and Beckwith’s Chapter Two65
helpfully illustrates the root of the issue with liberal neutrality: its restricted modern
standard of rationality.
Bardon acknowledges that liberal neutrality cannot provide its own justification and
that there must be a different standard that justifies liberalism’s anti-religious bias.66 She
then rejects three commonly-given justifications for this bias because these justifications
fail to provide a reason that transcends liberalism itself.67 Bardon then settles on the one
justification she considers persuasive in disfavoring religious claims: religious arguments
are “dangerous” to the extent that they “appeal to an absolutist conception of moral
truth.”68 By “an absolutist conception” she means one whose claims: (1) are “prescriptive”
in nature – they “tell us what to do”; (2) are based on a “first principle [that] is not
dependent on the context” and that is “indisputable because there can be no rational
argument for or against” it; and (3) “cannot be derived from the framework of liberal
democracy.”69
Bardon’s first and third characteristics of absolutist conceptions, as well as part of
the second, can be easily dismissed. All normative statements, religious or not, are
“prescriptive,” and the validity of the prescription always depends on some norm that is
accepted as a sufficient reason for the prescription. Bardon says absolutist prescriptions
are different because they are tautological, but this depends on the reason given for the
prescription. She may be correct that if the prescription is “do X because X is true and
corresponds to the nature of things,”70 it is tautological. But if the prescription is “do X
because Y will follow” or even “do X because God commands it,” there is no circularity
but only an unstated premise about why Y is good or who God is and why we should follow
his commands. Depending on how these premises are defined, they may lead to infinite
regression, but this is no more a problem with religious prescriptions than it is of any other
prescriptions.
Of course, Bardon is correct about the third characteristic of absolutist religious
64. Bardon, supra note 16, at 273–92.
65. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 13–52.
66. Bardon, supra note 16, at 279–82.
67. Id. at 275–82.
68. Id. at 282. Of course, Bardon concedes, not all religious claims have this absolutist structure, and even
those that do have an absolutist structure can shed it through a Rawlsian translation into a public reason. Id. at
283.
69. Id. at 282–83.
70. Bardon, supra note 16, at 281.
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arguments: they cannot be derived from liberalism itself. 71 But this can hardly count
against religious arguments or any other arguments meant to serve as a justifying standard
for liberalism. If the arguments justifying liberalism could be derived from liberalism, then
they could not provide a neutral standard outside of liberalism for distinguishing between
liberal values and religious values. Further, neither can liberalism’s own values of equality
and justice be derived from within the framework of liberal democracy. Why should
people be treated equally? What does justice require? One could answer these and other
questions by pointing to other liberal values, like efficiency or individual autonomy, but
this would just shift the question to those values: how can they be derived from within the
liberal framework? Alternatively, questions about equality and justice can be answered by
pointing to values outside the liberal framework, like inherent human dignity or the
demands of Christian charity. Either way, the fact that a value does not come from the
practice it is intended to justify cannot logically count against that value.
Eliminating these other characteristics leaves us with Bardon’s second characteristic
of an absolutist conception – that it is based on a first principle that is independent of
context and is indisputable. The first part of this characteristic can also be easily dismissed
as a truism. The fact that a principle is context-independent is just another way of saying
the principle is “absolute” in the sense that it does not depend on other things. And,
obviously, it would be tautological to say that an absolute value is illegitimate because it
is absolute. So, finally, we come to the main reason Bardon and many other liberals
disfavor religion: the claim that religious arguments operate according to a logic that is
unfalsifiable, infallible, or otherwise outside the ordinary standards of human rationality.72
Much of Beckwith’s second chapter refutes Bardon’s claim that religion is outside
ordinary standards of reason. For instance, Beckwith provides a wealth of citations to
rigorous and well-developed intellectual defenses of the “metaphysical, epistemological,
historical, and moral beliefs” of Christianity. 73 Beckwith then addresses some of the
reasons why Bardon and others like Brian Leiter dismiss these types of arguments as based
on “indisputable” premises.74 First, critics like Leiter and Bardon presume a “narrow
foundationalist” epistemology, which provides that “we are rationally justified in holding
our beliefs if and only if they are properly basic (i.e., foundational) or are based on those
foundational beliefs.”75 Beckwith then argues – persuasively in my view – that this
foundationalist epistemology is just as self-contradictory as the argument that liberal
norms can be justified by liberal norms. Simply put: the belief that we should only hold
beliefs that are properly basic or that are based on properly basic beliefs is not itself a basic
belief or based on a properly basic belief. 76
71. Id. at 282.
72. Id. at 284 (quoting Richard Rorty, Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration, 31 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 141, 148–49 (2003) (arguing that their reliance on indisputable first principles make religious claims
“conversation-stoppers”)).
73. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 26–30, 61–82. Agree or disagree with the conclusions reached by these
authors, anyone looking for a good set of readings by Christian academics and others who take both their faith
and the demands of their intellectual discipline seriously could do much worse than starting with the sources
Beckwith cites in this section.
74. Id. at 33–46 (citing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013)).
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. (citing ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANTED CHRISTIAN BELIEF 94–97 (2000)).
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Similarly, when Bardon and others reject “absolutist” religious arguments as based
on “indisputable”77 or “incontestable”78 first principles, they are not basing their own
argument on indisputable and incontestable first principles. Faced with this dilemma,
Leiter and many other scholars fall back on science as a possible reservoir of contestable
and disputable techniques and principles that can justify their distaste for religion. 79 But
this produces the same conundrum because the scientific method itself cannot, even in
principle, demonstrate that the scientific method is the only proper method of arriving at
knowledge.80 Also, this sort of rank scientism betrays a startling romanticism and naiveté
about how science works. Scientific progress occurs through shifts in socially constructed
and maintained “paradigms” that determine what questions are relevant to ask and what
constitutes good answers.81
These problems with the clearest and boldest defenses of liberalism’s rejection of
religious claims push us to either find some better first principles for rationality –
principles that make sense of, but that are not derived from, our rationality itself – or else
retreat into a narrow dogmatism more cramped than that of any fundamentalist believer.
Beckwith begins to point the way toward the discovery of new and better principles of
rationality. In contrast to narrow foundationalism, he notes that “there are all sorts of ways
that one can try to ‘prove’ one’s point of view.” 82 But any mode of proving or convincing
– “whether in science, law, theology, mathematics, logic, history, or casino gambling” –
will require a set of “rationality norms” or “methodological principles” that “provide
direction to one’s reasoning.” 83 In short, proper reasoning proceeds from the “standards
of evidence and rational justification” that are “ordinary” for the type of rational practice
in which one is engaged.84 But having established the need for such “ordinary standards,”
Beckwith is content to show that Christian legal arguments rationally proceed from such
standards. He does not explain what it means to have “ordinary” standards or how such
standards compare to the standards held up by liberal secular critics of religion. The
concluding section of this essay will tackle this issue head-on.
FAITH, REASON, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
The problem with modern liberal neutrality is not merely that it disfavors or rejects
the legitimacy of religiously motivated practices and claims. The bigger problem is that
modern liberal neutrality is premised on a modern view of human reasoning that is static
and self-referential. In this section, I will defend some alternative views of rationality that
acknowledge the socially constructed nature of human knowledge without giving up the
77. Bardon, supra note 16, at 283–84.
78. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 23 (quoting Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 479–95 (1996)).
79. Id. at 33 (citing BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007)). See Brian Leiter & Michael Weisberg, Do You Only Have a
Brain?, NATION, Oct. 22, 2012, at 27–31. But see Bardon, supra note 16, at 282–83 (preferring scientific claims
to absolutist claims, but placing science alongside “political values, common sense, and logic”).
80. See Herman Daly, Feynman’s Unanswered Question, 26 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 13, 13–17 (2006).
81. See THOMAS F. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
82. BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 27.
83. Id. at 35, 37.
84. Id. at 39.
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pursuit of a truth that transcends liberalism and can legitimate its key normative
commitments.
A.

“Ordinary” and “Appropriate” Ways of Knowing

As the previous section has demonstrated, the issue of whether religious beliefs are
a legitimate basis for protected practices and legal arguments is what most divides the
scholars in these two books. But, using modern foundationalist logic, there is no principled
reason for believing that non-religious claims are any more rational than religious claims.
In this section, I will try to provide a more contingent and dynamic view of rationality that
places religious and non-religious claims on the same existential and epistemological
footing by seeing them both as attempts to know the truth about reality.
“We have knowledge of something,” says philosopher Dallas Willard, “when we are
representing it (thinking about it, speaking of it, treating it) as it actually is, on an
appropriate basis of thought and experience.” 85 The “appropriate basis of thought and
experience” will, of course, depend on the “nature of the subject matter,” 86 just as
Beckwith acknowledges when he discusses “ordinary standards of evidence and rational
justification.”87 So the question becomes: how to decide what is “appropriate” or
“ordinary” evidence in support of a claim?
In his classic work on epistemology, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, John
Henry Newman provides some useful advice on this topic. 88 With Beckwith and Willard,
he acknowledges that there are different modes of holding, and expressing our relationship
to, the truth of various propositions: we can doubt, we can infer based on conditional logic,
or we can assent based on categorical assertion.89 But in any mode, I must “apprehend” or
know some sort of information in order to arrive at the truth I hold.90 Perhaps what I know
is information about logic, or sense data, or memory, or even my reasons for trusting the
person who tells me the information. 91
Depending on the circumstance, any one of several modes of apprehension and
assent may be an “appropriate basis of thought and experience,” to use Willard’s phrase,
or an “ordinary standard of evidence” to use Beckwith’s phrase. What is appropriate to the
child at home is not appropriate to the undergraduate writing a paper or to the pilot of an
airliner crossing the Atlantic. But all ways of holding truth require “assent to first
principles . . . with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter.”92 These first
principles are things like instinct, logic, and conscience, which we acquire from the world
around us.93 We need to take for granted certain background assumptions that we acquire
from the social world, “from friends or strangers whom we fall in with in the course of our
day, the conversations or discussions to which we are parties, the newspapers, the light
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

DALLAS WILLARD, KNOWING CHRIST TODAY: WHY WE CAN TRUST SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDGE 15 (2009).
Id.
BECKWITH, supra note 6, at 39.
JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY IN AID OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT (Ian T. Ker ed., 1985) (1870).
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32–35.
Id. at 66.
NEWMAN, supra note 88, at 66–69.
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reading of the season.”94 We receive this information “with a spontaneous assent,” and it
comes to “constitute the furniture of the mind.” 95 Unless we implicitly welcome “the
truths, real or ostensible, which these informations supply . . . the principles, doctrines,
sentiments, facts, which constitute useful . . . knowledge” about “public matters,”
“morality,” “politics,” and our “social code,” we will never know anything else. 96 We can
come at last to profess a thing as being true, not based on absolute proofs, but based instead
on a kind of convergence of probabilities: our mind ranges over all it has surveyed and
comes to a kind of “right judgment” (the “Illative Sense”) in favor of the truth. 97
My point is not to convince readers that Newman’s argument about how we come
to assent to truth is the best account. My point is simply that Newman shows us that it is
possible to make a two-fold move that believers and non-believers alike have trouble
making: (1) seeing that “appropriate” and “ordinary” standards of evidence are socially
constructed and relative and (2) seeing simultaneously that this socially constructed way
of pursuing the truth can still give us access to a reality that transcends our thoughts. Seeing
these things clearly though will require more investigation of the social influences on the
pursuit of truth and knowledge than Newman provides.
B.

The Social Construction of Worldviews

Something like Newman’s argument that human beings arrive at truth with the aid
of the social world has now become a commonplace of philosophy and social theory. We
make sense of the world and our place within it by interacting with the norms and
expectations of others through a “social imaginary,” 98 or a “plausibility structure.”99 This
social imaginary or plausibility structure “incorporates a sense of the normal expectations
that we have of each other; the kind of common understanding which enables us to carry
out the collective practices that make up our social life.” 100 Some thinkers call this social
imaginary or plausibility structure a “worldview”: a “set of presuppositions (or
assumptions) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously) about the basic makeup of
our world”101 or even as “the comprehensive framework of our basic beliefs about
things.”102 Having a worldview (or a social imaginary or a plausibility structure) is not

94. Id. at 61.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 270–99.
98. TAYLOR, supra note 53, at 146 (defining a “social imaginary” as “the way we collectively imagine, even
pretheoretically, our social life”).
99. PETER L. BERGER, A RUMOR OF ANGELS: MODERN SOCIETY AND THE REDISCOVERY OF THE
SUPERNATURAL 138 (1990) (defining a “plausibility structure” as a sense of “what people actually find credible,”
regarding “views of reality,” which “depends on the social support these [views of reality] receive”); TAYLOR,
supra note 53, at 171 (arguing that the ways in which people “imagine their social existence, how they fit together
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the
deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations” structure and guide human actions in a
deep way).
100. TAYLOR, supra note 53, at 172.
101. Sander Griffioen, The Worldview Approach to Social Theory: Hazards and Benefits, in STAINED GLASS:
WORLDVIEWS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 81, 81 (1989) (quoting JAMES SIRE, THE UNIVERSE NEXT DOOR: A BASIC
WORLDVIEW CATALOG 17 (1976)).
102. Id. at 81–82 (quoting ALBERT M. WOLTERS, CREATION REGAINED: BIBLICAL BASICS FOR A
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optional – it is not something that can be chosen or not chosen – but it is a required
precondition for knowing anything in the first place. 103 Indeed, a worldview can be seen
as coextensive with “the totality of the culturally structured images and assumptions . . .
in terms of which people both perceive and respond to reality.” 104 So, “refusing to adopt
an explicit worldview,” as liberal theory attempts to do, turns out to be itself “the product
of a worldview or at least a philosophic position.”105 For example, when judges and
legislators in liberal democracies attempt to reserve judgement or remain agnostic about
questions of “prime reality” or “what happens after death,” at the level of social policy or
law, they are actually providing an answer to the question, “how do we know what is right
and wrong?” The answer is something like: “we know what is right and wrong by
considering such matters according to our private consciences.” Thus, despite wanting to
remain aloof and neutral between religious and other worldviews, liberal democracy
cannot escape these sorts of basic value judgments. Like all truly human enterprises of
thought and action, including all the world’s other religions and ideologies, liberalism is
inherently value-laden.
The value choices that are embodied in social imaginaries, plausibility structures, or
worldviews, though, are not once-for-all received or discovered realities. Instead, they are
culturally and socially constructed achievements: like all forms of human thought and
action, social imaginaries and worldviews are situated within particular cultural, linguistic,
political, and other contexts.106 Even a worldview held by an individual “is communal in
scope and structure” because it results from community expectations and norms about
REFORMATIONAL WORLDVIEW 2 (1985)). Worldview theory has been advanced most prominently by
conservative Christians in the United States (including Beckwith) who have taken great pains to articulate and
defend a coherent system of ideas that they believe is more persuasive than its competitors, such as scientific
naturalism and liberal secularism. See SIRE, supra note 101; MARY POPLIN, IS REALITY SECULAR? TESTING THE
ASSUMPTIONS OF FOUR GLOBAL WORLDVIEWS (2014); TO EVERYONE AN ANSWER: A CASE FOR THE CHRISTIAN
WORLDVIEW (Francis J. Beckwith, William Lane Craig & J.P. Moreland eds., 2004); MICHAEL W. GOHEEN &
CRAIG G. BARTHOLOMEW, LIVING AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW
(2008); THINK BIBLICALLY! RECOVERING A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW (John MacArthur ed., 2009); J.P.
MORELAND & WILLIAM LANE CRAIG, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW (2003);
FRANCIS SCHAEFFER, HOW SHOULD WE THEN LIVE? THE RISE AND DECLINE OF WESTERN THOUGHT AND
CULTURE (1976). This conservative Christian usage of worldview theory originated in the Dutch Reformed
theology of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd, which was a significant influence on Francis Schaeffer,
who almost single-handedly created the idea of a Christian worldview in the 1970s and 1980s. See DAVID K.
NAUGLE, WORLDVIEW: THE HISTORY OF A CONCEPT 16–32 (2002). But the idea of a “worldview” or
“Weltanschauung” as a sort of comprehensive theory of or perspective on life can be traced back much further
in the history of western social theory, especially to Wilhelm Dilthey. See id. at 73. For good histories of the
concept of a “worldview” and its employment in various contexts, see Griffioen, supra note 101, at 84–93, and
JAMES W. SIRE, NAMING THE ELEPHANT: WORLDVIEW AS A CONCEPT (2015) [hereinafter SIRE, NAMING THE
ELEPHANT].
103. SIRE, NAMING THE ELEPHANT, supra note 102, at 37–42 (describing various thinkers who hold that a
worldview consists of “pretheoretical and presuppositional concepts that are the foundation for all of one’s
thought and action”).
104. CHARLES KRAFT, WORLDVIEWS FOR CHRISTIAN WITNESS 12 (2008).
105. SIRE, NAMING THE ELEPHANT, supra note 102, at 21.
106. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); William M. Sullivan & Paul Rabinow, The Interpretive Turn:
Emergence of an Approach, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER 1–21 (Paul Rabinow & William M.
Sullivan eds., 1979); Charles Taylor, The Dialogical Self, in THE INTERPRETIVE TURN 304–14 (David R. Hiley
et al. eds., 1991); THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUTH: DE-CONFUSING AND RE-CONSTRUCTING THE POSTMODERN
WORLD (Walter Truett Anderson ed., 1995).
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what it is appropriate to believe, do, and say.107
Most conservative Christians, Beckwith included, as well as some conservative
adherents of other religious faiths, embrace the concept of a religious worldview or
plausibility structure but staunchly resist the idea that it is socially constructed because
they equate the social construction of value judgments with moral relativism. 108
Conversely, some scholars published in the Cohen-Laborde book affirm the contestability
of value judgments implied by the social construction thesis and use it as a reason for
withholding judgment on matters as central to contemporary liberal democratic theory as
the enforcement of women’s civil rights within religious institutions. 109
But these fears of the relativism inherent in the idea of socially constructed
worldviews are misplaced. According to Peter Berger – one of the originators of the idea
of socially constructed plausibility structures – the main problem is not that we take the
idea of relativism too far, but that we do not take it far enough.110 Rather than hedging our
bets by acknowledging the relativity of some social constructs, such as customs of dress
and food, but not other social constructs, like religious beliefs, we have to be willing “to
see the relativity business through to its very end.”111
When we see relativity through to the end, “a rather strange thing happens,” Berger
notes: “the question of truth reasserts itself in almost pristine simplicity.” 112 If we accept
the idea that all worldviews are time-bound and language-bound and culture-bound, etc.,
we must also accept that our own worldview is also time-bound and language-bound and
culture-bound, etc. This acceptance of the relative truth of our current beliefs naturally
raises the issue of whether we have good reasons for holding them. But, crucially, as we
conduct this inquiry into whether we have good reasons for believing certain things, we
are no longer free to privilege modern over ancient reasons, since both are equally socially
constructed. We are no longer free to act out of the modern hubris, that we enlightened
ones who acknowledge the social construction of knowledge and belief are superior to
those ancient simpletons who thought that knowledge and belief were more objective. “We
may say,” argues Berger, “that contemporary consciousness is such and such,” but “we
are still left with the question of whether we will assent to it.”113
This conclusion about the social construction of worldviews is crucial for the fate of
religious worldviews in a liberal society, particularly those that depend on some form of

107. See James Olthius, On Worldviews, in STAINED GLASS, supra note 101, at 29, 29–30.
108. Compare FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, POLITICS FOR CHRISTIANS: STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT 18 (2010)
(embracing the idea of a Christian “plausibility structure” and defining it as “the set of ideas the person either is
or is not willing to entertain as possibly true”), with id. at 21 (“[T]o the degree that postmodernism denies the
objectivity of reality, truth, value, and reason, . . . to the degree that it believes intentionality creates the objects
of consciousness, to that degree it should be resisted by Christian intellectuals.”). See also Accetti, supra note
35, at 294–95 (discussing Pope Benedict’s criticism of the “dictatorship of relativism,” Pope Francis’s criticism
of a “tyranny of relativism,” John Piper’s assertion that moral relativism is a “perilous threat to free societies
today,” and Sayyid Qutb’s critique of western societies for “losing their commitment to a set of ‘absolute’ . . .
values”).
109. Phillips, supra note 15, at 57–59.
110. BERGER, supra note 99, at 44–53. For Berger’s original contribution to the idea of socially constructed
plausibility structures, see BERGER & LUCKMAN, supra note 106.
111. Id. at 44.
112. Id. at 44–45.
113. Id. at 46.
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historical divine revelation. Both the modern liberal worldview and the worldview “of the
New Testament writers,” or the Q’uran, or the Torah, or the Upanishads, were “constructed
and maintained by the same kind of social processes . . . . Each has its appropriate
plausibility structure, its plausibility-maintaining mechanisms.”114 Once this is
understood, “then the appeal to any alleged modern consciousness” (not excluding the
consciousness of liberal democracy) “loses most of its persuasiveness.”115 As a result, “an
important shift takes place in the argument on the alleged demise of the supernatural in
contemporary society,”116 or, we could also say, in the argument that a liberal legal or
political system can remain aloof or neutral between competing conceptions of religion or
the good. Namely, “relativizing analysis, in being pushed to its final consequence, bends
back upon itself” and modern liberal relativizers of value positions are themselves
relativized—“indeed, relativization itself is somehow liquidated.”117 And what follows is
not, as some conservative Christians, Muslims, and others fear, “a total paralysis of
thought”118 or a “passive acceptance of any form of injustice” 119 and totalitarianism, but
rather “a new freedom and flexibility in asking questions of truth,” including questions
that could have religious answers.120
CONCLUSION: A “MESSAGE IN A BOTTLE” FOR MODERN LIBERAL LEGAL THEORY
The preceding sections documented the problems with the liberal project of abstract
neutrality toward religious claims, using some of the best arguments found in the Beckwith
and the Cohen-Laborde volumes, supplemented by a more thorough exploration informed
by Newman’s epistemology and the social theory of worldviews. This exploration
illustrates the possibility for western legal and political systems to deal with religious
claims and practices in a more humble and contingent way, one that is more conscious of
the socially constructed and relativistic nature of its own claims to adjudicate these
controversies. In this concluding section, the essay points toward an alternative post-liberal
mode of treating religiously motivated legal claims. Constructing a fully articulated
explanation of this post-liberal project is an enormous task that is well beyond the scope
of this work. Nevertheless, painting in broad strokes, there are some themes that could be
helpful for such a project.
First, since religious practices and legal claims are based on different sorts of
experiences in the world, liberal legal systems must become more adept at listening to and
valuing different existential experiences that lead to different religious conclusions.
Instead of merely examining the public justification for religious claims in the abstract,
judges and legislators should follow Anne Phillips’s advice about “taking seriously”
religious believers’ “own self-descriptions and the meaning they themselves attach to their
114. Id.
115. BERGER, supra note 99, at 46.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 47.
118. Id.
119. Accetti, supra note 35, at 297 (citing Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter: Lumen Fidei (June 29, 2013),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20130629_enciclica-lumenfidei.html).
120. BERGER, supra note 99, at 47.
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practices and beliefs.”121
Taking religious experience more seriously requires us to take seriously Martin
Heidegger’s insight that there is a foundational ontological difference between dealing
with a “what” and dealing with a “who.”122 In dealing with a “what”—an object or a thing
in the world such as a claim to legal protection or an argument about the social
consequences of a law—it makes sense to isolate various aspects of how the thing acts and
reacts within a particular system. Indeed, this sort of data may be all that is necessary to
understand the material structures and processes of an object. But the same approach does
not make sense in dealing with a “who.” To be a person means that something can be true
about me, just as with an object, but also that something can be true for me. Persons can
certainly be objects of concern to other people, and to governmental systems; but to be a
person at all means to be concerned about one’s own existence.123 In turn, being concerned
for one’s existence can only take shape within a “world” toward which that concern is
directed.124 This is another way of saying that liberal legal systems need to become more
“personalist,”125 working “from a relationship with the other as person” and proceeding
“to an account of the other still as person.”126
Second, treating human beings as persons means being sensitive to the stories that
people tell when articulating the reasons for their religious actions and beliefs. Rather than
treating human actions and claims as objective inputs into an objective political “system,”
a personalist focus would seek to understand the narrative of a person’s life and how that
narrative affects what they are claiming about their religious practice or motive. 127
Storytelling and narrative political praxis are subversive ways to counter and critique the
hegemonic liberal discourse of objective neutrality. As Hannah Arendt showed,
storytelling and narrative can sometimes give witness to the truth in a more powerful way
than seemingly straightforward propositions and concepts. 128 “I form an opinion,” she
argues, “by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my
mind the standpoints of those who are absent,” and “[t]he more people’s standpoints I have
present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, the better I can imagine how I
would feel and think if I were in their place,” and “the more valid” will be “my final
conclusions, my opinion.”129 The unique value of narrative in expressing a viewpoint or
a standpoint that tends to be marginalized by dominant discourse is a hallmark of certain
forms of feminist and critical race scholarship, where it is thought to serve an emancipatory

121. Phillips, supra note 15, at 51.
122. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 71 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 7th ed. 2008).
123. Id. at 84–85.
124. Id. at 86–87.
125. A “personalist” approach is one that “regards or tends to regard the person as the ultimate explanatory,
epistemological, ontological, and axiological principle of all reality.” Personalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism (last updated Dec. 2, 2013).
126. R. D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: AN EXISTENTIAL STUDY IN SANITY AND MADNESS 20 (1955) (emphasis
added).
127. Id. at 20–21.
128. See MICHAEL JACKSON, THE POLITICS OF STORYTELLING: VIOLENCE, TRANSGRESSION, AND
INTERSUBJECTIVITY 36 (2002).
129. Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1967, at 49, 54, available at
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1967/02/25/truth-and-politics.
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role.130
Those whose worldview is more powerful in society – such as those who have the
worldview of liberal democratic theory – are perceived as more credible and so they “have
the power to create fact; those whose stories are not believed live in a legally sanctioned
‘reality’ that does not match their perceptions.” 131 Through storytelling though, these
“differences between insiders and outsiders” are “played out by lawmakers, judges,
witnesses and juries,” giving “outsiders . . . the right to question the legitimacy of the
prevailing truth.”132 Not that religious believers are all cultural outsiders – this would be
hard to maintain in the U.S. context at least. But it is clear that societies governed by
secular liberal democratic theory do consider that religious viewpoints, if taken too
seriously, can threaten the foundations of liberalism. In this sort of context, paying closer
attention to religious stories is a way to counterbalance and perhaps even to subvert the
prevailing hegemonic narrative of liberal neutrality.
Third, liberal legal systems need to move beyond taking the religious worldview
seriously in these ways and begin to try and understand whether the claims made within
the religious worldview are actually true and what that might mean for the law. It is not
enough to examine how the words of religious claimants might be true for them. Once we
have digested Newman’s and Berger’s explanations of how religious believers are making
the same sorts of socially constructed claims about reality as secular citizens are, we are
obliged to consider whether they might actually be correct about that reality. This serious
consideration, not only of the perspective a person holds but of the truth they see through
that perspective, is becoming more and more rare in our post-truth culture. It is beginning
to literally rip us apart with violence and suspicion.
The truths that religious believers hold are not limited to theological doctrines.
Religious worldviews deal with issues that are crucial to a liberal democratic society, such
as human dignity, the qualities and requisites of personhood, and what rights and
obligations people have toward one another. Engaging properly with these and other
religious values means changing our attitude from treating religious claims as a feared
“other” to seeing religion as another valid way of being in the world that might be
persuasive for our predicament.
In his essay, The Message in the Bottle, philosophical novelist and essayist Walker
Percy nicely captures the attitude difference between liberalism’s abstract perspective and
the post-liberal perspective I am advocating here.133 Imagine, he urges us, the situation of
a well-educated castaway who begins discovering bottles on the beach, each tightly corked
and each containing a single piece of paper with a message written on it. 134 The messages

130. See, e.g., ELAINE J. LAWLESS, WOMEN ESCAPING VIOLENCE: EMPOWERMENT THROUGH NARRATIVE
(2001); Kristin M. Langellier, Personal Narratives: Perspectives on Theory and Research, 9 TEXT &
PERFORMANCE Q. 243 (1989); Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New
Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 46–73 (2002).
131. Jones, supra note 130, at 59. See also Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2073, 2079–80 (1989).
132. Jones, supra note 130, at 59. See also Scheppele, supra note 131, at 2079–80.
133. WALKER PERCY, The Message in the Bottle, in THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE: HOW QUEER MAN IS,
HOW QUEER LANGUAGE IS, AND WHAT ONE HAS TO DO WITH THE OTHER 119, 119–49 (1975).
134. Id. at 119–20.
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are wide-ranging and diverse, containing things like: “Lead melts at 330 degrees,” “[a]
war party is approaching from Bora Bora,” “Chicago, a city, is on Lake Michigan,” “[t]he
British are coming,” and “[t]here is fresh water in the next cove.” 135
The castaway faces a choice about how to sort out and interpret these messages. He
could sort them using objective categories like geography, chemistry, philosophy, history,
etc.136 That would make perfect sense for someone in a different situation, like a scientist.
But it will not do for the castaway. His situation requires – indeed, it demands – an entirely
different approach; he sees the messages as containing not merely statements of fact, but
something much more valuable to him: “news.” 137 And his response to some of this
“news” could very well determine whether he lives or dies. From the castaway’s
perspective, argues Percy, there are not only “two kinds of sentences in the bottles,” but
there are also “two kinds of postures from which one reads the sentences, two kinds of
verifying procedures by which one acts upon them, and two kinds of responses to the
sentences.”138
Thus, “everything depends on the situation of the hearer.” 139 The situation of being
a castaway entails a necessary loss of some form of objectivity and an embrace of some
form of subjectivity. But this does not hamper the castaway’s search for truth. In fact, it is
precisely the castaway’s subjective posture of lostness, hunger, thirst, and fear that makes
the truth or falsity of the news so urgent. It is not appropriate for him to assess the messages
as information about some abstract truths. It is vital for the castaway’s survival that he see
the messages as containing news through which he can be saved.
Just so, everything depends on our appraisal of the situation we find ourselves in at
present in liberal democratic societies. We can continue to assess religious legal and
political claims in the “neutral” way we did while still onboard the ship, before it began to
sink. And we might even discover some good information in this way. After all, lead melts
at 330 degrees for the castaway and the sailor alike. But maybe what we really need is
news from an unexpected source – news about things vital to our survival, like how to
respect the dignity of those we would rather ignore, how to forgive our enemies even
though we have every right to be angry at them, or how to fulfill the demands of justice
even in the face of powerful forces that care only about control or efficiency. These are
not private issues; they fill the dockets of every court in the land. Religious worldviews
claim to address these questions not merely with beliefs and opinions but with the truth
about reality. But we cannot see that truth because our view of rationality is too narrow.
Perhaps the time has now arrived for us post-truth castaways to look for news in expected
places.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 120–21, 123.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 123.
PERCY, supra note 133, at 125.
Id. at 131.
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